An Economic Analysis of the Confidential Obligation of Attorney and Prescription of Prosecution

Translated title of the contribution: 法律追诉时效制度的经济分析: 挑战中外法学界主流观点

Enfu Cheng, 管 文杰

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper is an economical study of the rationality of the confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution.Through the behavior analysis centering on the cost -income related to the parties involved, this paper concludes that the confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution can not realize the maxim of judicial proceeds at a low level of private and social costs, that is , these two rules result in the low efficiency of the judicial resource allocation .
Original languageChinese (Simplified)
Pages (from-to)72-83+98
Journal云南大学学报(社会科学版)
Issue number5
Publication statusPublished - 2005

Fingerprint

prosecution
obligation
medication
behavior analysis
social costs
rationality
income
efficiency
costs
resources

Keywords

  • Economics of Law
  • (Economic Analysis of Law
  • (Law and Economics

Cite this

An Economic Analysis of the Confidential Obligation of Attorney and Prescription of Prosecution. / Cheng, Enfu; 管文杰.

In: 云南大学学报(社会科学版), No. 5, 2005, p. 72-83+98.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{572f2ffd146d4cc88d9dc2143eb9b5a7,
title = "An Economic Analysis of the Confidential Obligation of Attorney and Prescription of Prosecution",
abstract = "This paper is an economical study of the rationality of the confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution.Through the behavior analysis centering on the cost -income related to the parties involved, this paper concludes that the confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution can not realize the maxim of judicial proceeds at a low level of private and social costs, that is , these two rules result in the low efficiency of the judicial resource allocation .",
keywords = "Economics of Law, (Economic Analysis of Law, (Law and Economics",
author = "Enfu Cheng and 文杰 管",
year = "2005",
language = "Chinese (Simplified)",
pages = "72--83+98",
journal = "云南大学学报(社会科学版)",
issn = "1671-7511",
number = "5",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - An Economic Analysis of the Confidential Obligation of Attorney and Prescription of Prosecution

AU - Cheng, Enfu

AU - 管, 文杰

PY - 2005

Y1 - 2005

N2 - This paper is an economical study of the rationality of the confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution.Through the behavior analysis centering on the cost -income related to the parties involved, this paper concludes that the confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution can not realize the maxim of judicial proceeds at a low level of private and social costs, that is , these two rules result in the low efficiency of the judicial resource allocation .

AB - This paper is an economical study of the rationality of the confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution.Through the behavior analysis centering on the cost -income related to the parties involved, this paper concludes that the confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution can not realize the maxim of judicial proceeds at a low level of private and social costs, that is , these two rules result in the low efficiency of the judicial resource allocation .

KW - Economics of Law

KW - (Economic Analysis of Law

KW - (Law and Economics

M3 - 文章

SP - 72-83+98

JO - 云南大学学报(社会科学版)

JF - 云南大学学报(社会科学版)

SN - 1671-7511

IS - 5

ER -