代理理论、所有制与公司治理效率:一个分析框架: 兼与张维迎教授商榷

Translated title of the contribution: A Framework on Agency Theory,Ownership Style and Corporate Governance Efficiency: Concurrently a Deliberation with Prof. Zhang Wei-ying

夏 立军

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Based on agency theory, this paper investigates the differences about corporate governance between private一owned listed company and big SOE ( State一owned enterprise) to illustrate the relationship between ownership style and corporate governance efficiency. The analysis of this paper shows that corporate governance efficiency is related to many corporate governance environment factors such as ownership culture, legal environment, trust system and the level of government governance, and that corporate govemance environment is a factor more important than ownership style. Moreover, the paper shows that public ownership does not necessarily mean lower corporate governance efficiency than private ownership. Both the two ownership styles have their difficulties in corporate governance. The key means to overcome the difficulties is to build a good corporate governance environment. The framework of this paper has both theoretic and practical significance for the reform of SOEs and corporate governance.
Original languageChinese (Simplified)
Pages (from-to)159-169
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Economics of Shanghai School
Volume2
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2004
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Deliberation
Corporate governance
Ownership
Governance environment
Factors
Agency theory
Public ownership
Governance
Legal environment
Listed companies
Government
State-owned enterprises
Private ownership

Keywords

  • Agency Theory
  • Public Ownership
  • Private Ownership
  • Corporate
  • Governance Efficiency

Cite this

代理理论、所有制与公司治理效率:一个分析框架 : 兼与张维迎教授商榷. / 夏立军.

In: Journal of Economics of Shanghai School, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2004, p. 159-169.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{21a2e4a422cf4682b6b3f959e2bf8495,
title = "代理理论、所有制与公司治理效率:一个分析框架: 兼与张维迎教授商榷",
abstract = "本文从代理理论出发,考察了大型国有企业和私人控股的上市公司在公司治理上的不同,藉以说明所有制形式与公司治理效率之间的关系。本文的分析表明,公司治理效率是和股权文化、法制环境、信用体系、政府治理水平等公司治理环境密切相关的,公司治理环境是相对所有制形式来说更为重要的因素;公有制的公司治理效率并不必然比私有制的公司治理效率低下,两者都存在着难以解决的公司治理难题,营造良好的公司治理环境才是解决这些难题的关键。本文的分析框架对于我国的国有企业改革和公司治理改革具有一定的理论和实践意义。",
keywords = "Agency Theory, Public Ownership, Private Ownership, Corporate, Governance Efficiency, 代理理论, 公有制, 私有制, 公司治理, 效率",
author = "立军 夏",
year = "2004",
language = "Chinese (Simplified)",
volume = "2",
pages = "159--169",
journal = "Journal of Economics of Shanghai School",
publisher = "上海财经大学海派经济学研究中心",
number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - 代理理论、所有制与公司治理效率:一个分析框架

T2 - 兼与张维迎教授商榷

AU - 夏, 立军

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - 本文从代理理论出发,考察了大型国有企业和私人控股的上市公司在公司治理上的不同,藉以说明所有制形式与公司治理效率之间的关系。本文的分析表明,公司治理效率是和股权文化、法制环境、信用体系、政府治理水平等公司治理环境密切相关的,公司治理环境是相对所有制形式来说更为重要的因素;公有制的公司治理效率并不必然比私有制的公司治理效率低下,两者都存在着难以解决的公司治理难题,营造良好的公司治理环境才是解决这些难题的关键。本文的分析框架对于我国的国有企业改革和公司治理改革具有一定的理论和实践意义。

AB - 本文从代理理论出发,考察了大型国有企业和私人控股的上市公司在公司治理上的不同,藉以说明所有制形式与公司治理效率之间的关系。本文的分析表明,公司治理效率是和股权文化、法制环境、信用体系、政府治理水平等公司治理环境密切相关的,公司治理环境是相对所有制形式来说更为重要的因素;公有制的公司治理效率并不必然比私有制的公司治理效率低下,两者都存在着难以解决的公司治理难题,营造良好的公司治理环境才是解决这些难题的关键。本文的分析框架对于我国的国有企业改革和公司治理改革具有一定的理论和实践意义。

KW - Agency Theory

KW - Public Ownership

KW - Private Ownership

KW - Corporate

KW - Governance Efficiency

KW - 代理理论

KW - 公有制

KW - 私有制

KW - 公司治理

KW - 效率

M3 - 文章

VL - 2

SP - 159

EP - 169

JO - Journal of Economics of Shanghai School

JF - Journal of Economics of Shanghai School

IS - 3

ER -