Abstract
This paper is an economical study of the rationality of the confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution.Through the behavior analysis centering on the cost -income related to the parties involved, this paper concludes that the confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution can not realize the maxim of judicial proceeds at a low level of private and social costs, that is , these two rules result in the low efficiency of the judicial resource allocation .
| Translated title of the contribution | 法律追诉时效制度的经济分析: 挑战中外法学界主流观点 |
|---|---|
| Original language | Chinese (Simplified) |
| Pages (from-to) | 72-83+98 |
| Journal | 云南大学学报(社会科学版) |
| Issue number | 5 |
| Publication status | Published - 2005 |
Keywords
- Economics of Law
- (Economic Analysis of Law
- (Law and Economics