律师保密义务和追诉时效制度的经济分析

挑战中外法学界主流理论

Translated title of the contribution: Economic Analysis of Confidential Obligation of Attorney and Prescription of Prosecution

Enfu Cheng, 管 文杰

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

18 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This paper provides an economical study on the rationality of confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution. Through behavior analysis centered on cost-income for the parties involved, this paper discovers the confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution can not realize the maxim of judicial proceeds in a low level of private cost and social cost outcome, which is to say, these two rules result in the low efficiency of the judicial resource allocation.
Original languageChinese (Simplified)
Pages (from-to)8-40
Journal海派经济学
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2004

Fingerprint

prosecution
obligation
medication
behavior analysis
social costs
costs
rationality
economics
income
efficiency
resources

Keywords

  • Fair
  • Efficiency
  • Confidential Obligation of Attorney
  • Prescription of Prosecution

Cite this

律师保密义务和追诉时效制度的经济分析 : 挑战中外法学界主流理论. / Cheng, Enfu; 管文杰.

In: 海派经济学, No. 1, 2004, p. 8-40.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{3b20158055d1460cb44e87af5397a7bc,
title = "律师保密义务和追诉时效制度的经济分析: 挑战中外法学界主流理论",
abstract = "本文的研究属于经济学分析法学的范畴,试图以经济学方法探讨律师保密义务和追诉时效制度在确保公正的前提下可能出现的效率问题,从而分析这两项制度安排的合理性。本文通过对两者涉及的各相关主体进行以成本—收益分析为核心的行为分析,发现律师保密义务和追诉时效制度无法在较低的私人成本、社会成本支出水平上实现司法收益的最大化,即这两项制度导致了司法资源配置的低效率。",
keywords = "Fair, Efficiency, Confidential Obligation of Attorney, Prescription of Prosecution, 公平, 效率, 律师保密义务, 追诉时效",
author = "Enfu Cheng and 文杰 管",
year = "2004",
language = "Chinese (Simplified)",
pages = "8--40",
journal = "Journal of Economics of Shanghai School",
publisher = "上海财经大学海派经济学研究中心",
number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - 律师保密义务和追诉时效制度的经济分析

T2 - 挑战中外法学界主流理论

AU - Cheng, Enfu

AU - 管, 文杰

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - 本文的研究属于经济学分析法学的范畴,试图以经济学方法探讨律师保密义务和追诉时效制度在确保公正的前提下可能出现的效率问题,从而分析这两项制度安排的合理性。本文通过对两者涉及的各相关主体进行以成本—收益分析为核心的行为分析,发现律师保密义务和追诉时效制度无法在较低的私人成本、社会成本支出水平上实现司法收益的最大化,即这两项制度导致了司法资源配置的低效率。

AB - 本文的研究属于经济学分析法学的范畴,试图以经济学方法探讨律师保密义务和追诉时效制度在确保公正的前提下可能出现的效率问题,从而分析这两项制度安排的合理性。本文通过对两者涉及的各相关主体进行以成本—收益分析为核心的行为分析,发现律师保密义务和追诉时效制度无法在较低的私人成本、社会成本支出水平上实现司法收益的最大化,即这两项制度导致了司法资源配置的低效率。

KW - Fair

KW - Efficiency

KW - Confidential Obligation of Attorney

KW - Prescription of Prosecution

KW - 公平

KW - 效率

KW - 律师保密义务

KW - 追诉时效

M3 - 文章

SP - 8

EP - 40

JO - Journal of Economics of Shanghai School

JF - Journal of Economics of Shanghai School

IS - 1

ER -