律师保密义务和追诉时效制度的经济分析: 挑战中外法学界主流理论

Translated title of the contribution: Economic Analysis of Confidential Obligation of Attorney and Prescription of Prosecution

Enfu Cheng, 管 文杰

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Abstract

This paper provides an economical study on the rationality of confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution. Through behavior analysis centered on cost-income for the parties involved, this paper discovers the confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution can not realize the maxim of judicial proceeds in a low level of private cost and social cost outcome, which is to say, these two rules result in the low efficiency of the judicial resource allocation.
Original languageChinese (Simplified)
Pages (from-to)8-40
Journal海派经济学
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2004

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Keywords

  • Fair
  • Efficiency
  • Confidential Obligation of Attorney
  • Prescription of Prosecution

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