律师保密义务的经济学探析: 海派经济学的法学观点

Translated title of the contribution: Economic Research on Lawyer's Duty of Secrecy : Jurisprudential view point of Economics of Shanghai School

Enfu Cheng, Wenjie Guan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This article falls into the category of legal economics.It tries to discuss about the efficiency of lawyersduty of secrecy in the premise ofensuringjusticesoastoanalyzeitsrationality.
Withabehavioralanalysiscenteredon“cost-profit” about corresponding subjects, it finds that popular the oryandme asures of lawyer's secrecy duty can't achieve the biggest profit at the
level of lower private cost and expenditure of socialcost, namely, the system leads to low efficiency of judicial resources collocation.
Original languageChinese (Simplified)
Pages (from-to)92-97
Number of pages6
Journal江苏行政学院学报
Issue number06
Publication statusPublished - Dec 30 2005

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economic research
secrecy
lawyer
profit
efficiency
school
economics
expenditures
costs
resources

Keywords

  • Lawyer's Duty of Secrecy
  • Justice
  • Efficiency
  • Legal Economics
  • Theory of Economics of Shanghai School

Cite this

律师保密义务的经济学探析 : 海派经济学的法学观点. / Cheng, Enfu; Guan, Wenjie.

In: 江苏行政学院学报, No. 06, 30.12.2005, p. 92-97.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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title = "律师保密义务的经济学探析: 海派经济学的法学观点",
abstract = "本文属于法律经济学的研究范畴,试图以经济学方法探讨律师保密义务在确保公正的前提下可能出现的效率问题,从而分析这项制度安排的合理性。文章通过对两者涉及的各相关主体进行以“成本收益”分析为核心的行为分析,发现流行的律师保密义务理论和措施无法在较低的私人成本、社会成本支出水平上实现司法收益的最大化,即这项制度导致了司法资源配置的低效率。",
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author = "Enfu Cheng and Wenjie Guan",
year = "2005",
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journal = "江苏行政学院学报",
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AU - Guan, Wenjie

PY - 2005/12/30

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N2 - 本文属于法律经济学的研究范畴,试图以经济学方法探讨律师保密义务在确保公正的前提下可能出现的效率问题,从而分析这项制度安排的合理性。文章通过对两者涉及的各相关主体进行以“成本收益”分析为核心的行为分析,发现流行的律师保密义务理论和措施无法在较低的私人成本、社会成本支出水平上实现司法收益的最大化,即这项制度导致了司法资源配置的低效率。

AB - 本文属于法律经济学的研究范畴,试图以经济学方法探讨律师保密义务在确保公正的前提下可能出现的效率问题,从而分析这项制度安排的合理性。文章通过对两者涉及的各相关主体进行以“成本收益”分析为核心的行为分析,发现流行的律师保密义务理论和措施无法在较低的私人成本、社会成本支出水平上实现司法收益的最大化,即这项制度导致了司法资源配置的低效率。

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KW - Efficiency

KW - Legal Economics

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KW - 律师保密义务

KW - 公平

KW - 效率

KW - 法律经济学

KW - 海派经济学理论

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JO - 江苏行政学院学报

JF - 江苏行政学院学报

SN - 1009-8860

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ER -