经济金融化行为的政治经济学分析: 一个演化博弈框架

Translated title of the contribution: Political Economics Analysis of Economic Financialization Behavior: An Analytical Framework of Evolutionary Game Theory

鲁 春义, Xiaoqin Ding

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Economic financialization has been the focus issue both at home and abroad since the 2008 subprime crisis.From a perspective of political economics,this paper points out the nature of financialization,namely capital accumulation transforms into capital appreciation process out of production and exchanges of surplus value and through financial systems.And then it establishes an asymmetry evolutionary game model with heterogeneity agents to analyze the dynamic evolutionary process of the relationship between non-financial and financial agents from ordinary economic relations to financial relations and its effect mechanism. The results are shown as follows:firstly,the dynamic relation evolution among economic agents indicates that non-financial firms obtain profits mainly through financial practices,financial firms focus on intermediary business and off-balance一sheet business and incorporate ordinary households into their system to make them new profits resources,and ordinary households are forced to accept the two-time benefit sharing from powerful economic agents;the changes in these relations lead to economic financialization and even a financial crisis in a country;secondly,economic development state depends on the interaction of financial and norrfinancial agents,and the behavior of non-financial agents plays a dominant role;under the given assumptions,when non-financial agents affect predatory technology of financial agents only through their own resources protection,a national economy may be promoted to a new stable state or a meltdown;when non-financial agents affect predatory technology of financial agents through their own resources protection and predatory technology,the economy can enter into an evolutionary stable state;thirdly,the impacts of financialization behavior of economic agents can be divided into three dimensions:financialization behavior of economic agents promote their own excess capital accumulation in the short run,the predatory behavior of financial agents and the production behavior of norrfinancial agents always present an opposite economic relation which is easily intensified,and free market without government intervention inevitably leads to the intensification of conflicts and falls into crises.Therefore,deep understanding of the nature of
economic finacialization and its mechanism of affecting the economy is of great significance to both economic transformation and financial reform in China.
Translated title of the contributionPolitical Economics Analysis of Economic Financialization Behavior: An Analytical Framework of Evolutionary Game Theory
Original languageChinese (Simplified)
Pages (from-to)52-62+74
Number of pages12
Journal财经研究
Issue number07
Publication statusPublished - 2016

Keywords

  • finacialization
  • evolutionary game theory
  • political economics
  • predatory technology
  • evolutionary stable strategy

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