经济金融化行为的政治经济学分析: 一个演化博弈框架

Translated title of the contribution: Political Economics Analysis of Economic Financialization Behavior: An Analytical Framework of Evolutionary Game Theory

鲁 春义, Xiaoqin Ding

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Economic financialization has been the focus issue both at home and abroad since the 2008 subprime crisis.From a perspective of political economics,this paper points out the nature of financialization,namely capital accumulation transforms into capital appreciation process out of production and exchanges of surplus value and through financial systems.And then it establishes an asymmetry evolutionary game model with heterogeneity agents to analyze the dynamic evolutionary process of the relationship between non-financial and financial agents from ordinary economic relations to financial relations and its effect mechanism. The results are shown as follows:firstly,the dynamic relation evolution among economic agents indicates that non-financial firms obtain profits mainly through financial practices,financial firms focus on intermediary business and off-balance一sheet business and incorporate ordinary households into their system to make them new profits resources,and ordinary households are forced to accept the two-time benefit sharing from powerful economic agents;the changes in these relations lead to economic financialization and even a financial crisis in a country;secondly,economic development state depends on the interaction of financial and norrfinancial agents,and the behavior of non-financial agents plays a dominant role;under the given assumptions,when non-financial agents affect predatory technology of financial agents only through their own resources protection,a national economy may be promoted to a new stable state or a meltdown;when non-financial agents affect predatory technology of financial agents through their own resources protection and predatory technology,the economy can enter into an evolutionary stable state;thirdly,the impacts of financialization behavior of economic agents can be divided into three dimensions:financialization behavior of economic agents promote their own excess capital accumulation in the short run,the predatory behavior of financial agents and the production behavior of norrfinancial agents always present an opposite economic relation which is easily intensified,and free market without government intervention inevitably leads to the intensification of conflicts and falls into crises.Therefore,deep understanding of the nature of
economic finacialization and its mechanism of affecting the economy is of great significance to both economic transformation and financial reform in China.
Original languageChinese (Simplified)
Pages (from-to)52-62+74
Number of pages12
Journal财经研究
Issue number07
Publication statusPublished - 2016

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Economics
Financialization
Political economics
Evolutionary game theory
Economic analysis
Household
Resources
Profit
Economic relations
Capital accumulation
Evolutionary
Subprime crisis
Financial crisis
Financial system
Economic evolution
Free market
Evolutionary game
Economic transformation
Intermediaries
Nature

Keywords

  • finacialization
  • evolutionary game theory
  • political economics
  • predatory technology
  • evolutionary stable strategy

Cite this

经济金融化行为的政治经济学分析 : 一个演化博弈框架. / 鲁春义; Ding, Xiaoqin.

In: 财经研究, No. 07, 2016, p. 52-62+74.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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title = "经济金融化行为的政治经济学分析: 一个演化博弈框架",
abstract = "自2008年美国金融危机发生以来,经济金融化成为国内外学界关注的焦点。文章从政治经济学的角度指出了金融化的本质在于资本积累演变为资本脱离剩余价值的生产与交换而通过金融系统实现增殖的过程,进而通过构建一个包含异质性主体的非对称演化博弈模型,揭示了非金融主体与金融主体之间从普通经济关系到金融关系的动态演变过程及其作用机制。研究表明:(1)经济主体之间的动态关系演变表现为非金融企业主要通过金融活动获取利润,金融企业则关注中间业务和表外业务并将普通家庭纳入其体系使之成为新的利润源泉,而普通家庭则被迫接受强势经济主体的二次分利,这些关系的变化将导致一国经济的金融化乃至金融危机。(2)经济发展状态取决于金...",
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author = "春义 鲁 and Xiaoqin Ding",
year = "2016",
language = "Chinese (Simplified)",
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AU - Ding, Xiaoqin

PY - 2016

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N2 - 自2008年美国金融危机发生以来,经济金融化成为国内外学界关注的焦点。文章从政治经济学的角度指出了金融化的本质在于资本积累演变为资本脱离剩余价值的生产与交换而通过金融系统实现增殖的过程,进而通过构建一个包含异质性主体的非对称演化博弈模型,揭示了非金融主体与金融主体之间从普通经济关系到金融关系的动态演变过程及其作用机制。研究表明:(1)经济主体之间的动态关系演变表现为非金融企业主要通过金融活动获取利润,金融企业则关注中间业务和表外业务并将普通家庭纳入其体系使之成为新的利润源泉,而普通家庭则被迫接受强势经济主体的二次分利,这些关系的变化将导致一国经济的金融化乃至金融危机。(2)经济发展状态取决于金...

AB - 自2008年美国金融危机发生以来,经济金融化成为国内外学界关注的焦点。文章从政治经济学的角度指出了金融化的本质在于资本积累演变为资本脱离剩余价值的生产与交换而通过金融系统实现增殖的过程,进而通过构建一个包含异质性主体的非对称演化博弈模型,揭示了非金融主体与金融主体之间从普通经济关系到金融关系的动态演变过程及其作用机制。研究表明:(1)经济主体之间的动态关系演变表现为非金融企业主要通过金融活动获取利润,金融企业则关注中间业务和表外业务并将普通家庭纳入其体系使之成为新的利润源泉,而普通家庭则被迫接受强势经济主体的二次分利,这些关系的变化将导致一国经济的金融化乃至金融危机。(2)经济发展状态取决于金...

KW - finacialization

KW - evolutionary game theory

KW - political economics

KW - predatory technology

KW - evolutionary stable strategy

KW - 金融化

KW - 演化博弈

KW - 政治经济学

KW - 分利技术

KW - 演化稳定策略

M3 - 文章

SP - 52-62+74

JO - 财经研究

JF - 财经研究

SN - 1001-9952

IS - 07

ER -