剩余索取权的悲剧与国有企业改革

Translated title of the contribution: The Tragedy of Claim to Residue and the Reforming of SOEs

陈 弘译

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Abstract

It is deemed that the claim to residue is the effective incentive implement to promote enterprise efficiency; the low efficiency and the operators' corruption of SOEs is the tragedy of the absent claim to residue. So that endowing the daim.to residue to the operators is the necessary step during the property rights reforming of SOEs. But the theoretical leaks of the prevalent claim to residue distort the claim to residue to be an implement figuring for operators' personal interests at cost the interests of enterprise and the public. The prevalent theory of claim to residue is supported by the potential interest groups; it may
damage the purposes of our reforming of the SOEs.
Original languageChinese (Simplified)
Pages (from-to)146-153
Number of pages8
JournalJournal of Economics of Shanghai School
Volume5
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2007
Externally publishedYes

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Tragedy
Operator
Enterprise
Property Rights
Costs
Interest Groups
Incentives
Corruption

Keywords

  • claim to residue
  • residual rights of control
  • efficicecy SOEs

Cite this

剩余索取权的悲剧与国有企业改革. / 陈弘译.

In: Journal of Economics of Shanghai School, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2007, p. 146-153.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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title = "剩余索取权的悲剧与国有企业改革",
abstract = "赋予企业经营者剩余索取权使其与剩余控制权对应,被认为是激励企业经营者提高企业效率,维护所有者利益的有效工具。按照剩余索取权的逻辑,国有企业的低效率和企业经营者腐败问题,是剩余索取权缺失的必然结果;要避免剩余索取权的悲剧,就必须在国有企业产权制度改革中赋予企业经营者剩余索取权。但赋予经营者剩余索取权,并不能避免剩余索取权的悲剧;流行的剩余索取权理论存在的漏洞,会使剩余索取权扭曲为经营者以损害企业和社会利益为代价谋取个人经济利益的工具。剩余索取权逻辑受到了潜在的利益集团的支持,这一逻辑的扩张将危及国有企业改革的目标。",
keywords = "claim to residue, residual rights of control, efficicecy SOEs, 剩余索取权, 剩余控制权, 效率, 国有企业",
author = "弘译 陈",
year = "2007",
language = "Chinese (Simplified)",
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journal = "Journal of Economics of Shanghai School",
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KW - claim to residue

KW - residual rights of control

KW - efficicecy SOEs

KW - 剩余索取权

KW - 剩余控制权

KW - 效率

KW - 国有企业

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EP - 153

JO - Journal of Economics of Shanghai School

JF - Journal of Economics of Shanghai School

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