律师保密义务和追诉时效制度的经济分析: 挑战中外法学界主流理论

Enfu Cheng, 管 文杰

研究成果: Article

42 ダウンロード数 (Pure)

抜粋

This paper provides an economical study on the rationality of confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution. Through behavior analysis centered on cost-income for the parties involved, this paper discovers the confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution can not realize the maxim of judicial proceeds in a low level of private cost and social cost outcome, which is to say, these two rules result in the low efficiency of the judicial resource allocation.
寄稿の翻訳されたタイトルEconomic Analysis of Confidential Obligation of Attorney and Prescription of Prosecution
元の言語Chinese (Simplified)
ページ(範囲)8-40
ジャーナル海派经济学
発行部数1
出版物ステータスPublished - 2004

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