律师保密义务和追诉时效制度的经济分析: 挑战中外法学界主流理论

Enfu Cheng, 管 文杰

Результат исследований: Articleрецензирование

79 Загрузки (Pure)

Аннотация

This paper provides an economical study on the rationality of confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution. Through behavior analysis centered on cost-income for the parties involved, this paper discovers the confidential obligation of attorney and prescription of prosecution can not realize the maxim of judicial proceeds in a low level of private cost and social cost outcome, which is to say, these two rules result in the low efficiency of the judicial resource allocation.
Переведенное названиеEconomic Analysis of Confidential Obligation of Attorney and Prescription of Prosecution
Язык оригиналаChinese (Simplified)
Страницы (с-по)8-40
Журнал海派经济学
Номер выпуска1
СостояниеPublished - 2004

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