FROM THE SOVIET MODEL OF LABOUR RELATIONS TO SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP: 
THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION

Gulnara Aitova

Abstract: The article is aimed at revealing the origins of the core contradictions in social and labour relations in Russia since the collapse of the USSR. The transition to market economy of Russian society since the early 1990s has not brought a fully fledged concept of labour relations. The concept of labour relations found in Russia today is rather the product of the ignorance of the state authorities, which led to a situation of increased tension between labour and capital. The contradictions in social and labour-relations stem, on the one hand, from Soviet society, and on the other, have been generated by the transition to market per se. The author endeavours to give response to the question, why does a model of social partnership limit itself only to its formal aspects rather than seek an essential shift in the direction of the establishment workable framework of labour relations?

Key words: labour relations in Russia; privatization; social partnership; working class; power-property matrix

1. Economic Transition and Labour Relations

The Russian academic tradition regards the entity of social relations relating generally to the field of labour (unlike the term “industrial relations”) as “social and labour relations.” Nevertheless, labour relations as such are defined as the relation of an employee towards production and the results of her or his labour. This criterion can categorically indicate the nature of labour relations in the framework
of a socio-economic system. At the same time, the term has been developed and applied by one of the founders of Russian industrial sociology, V. Gerchikov, to characterize labour relations in a broader sense:

Labour relations are relationships between groups of employees in an enterprise (organization) distinguishing themselves by specific interests in the field of labour, to some extent consciously seeing these interests as special (other than the interests of other groups), and carrying out some organizational steps to protect and implement their own interests. (Zaslavskaya and Kalugina 1999, 321)

It should be added that the social dimensions of labour relations in the Russian version indicate the key role played in them by the state’s authority.

The latter explains why a tripartite system of social partnership was chosen in the transition period. Namely, in the Soviet model of labour relations, the chief actors were the state, the trade union and the director of an enterprise (organization, institution). A key feature of the relationship between these entities was that they were not horizontally but strictly hierarchically structured and all under the Party’s bureaucracy. Being the sole holder of state property, the bureaucracy functioned as an “employer” and granted respective functions to the corps of directors and directly controlled trade unions, whose duties were limited to social security questions at the workplace. The contradictions of the Soviet social system implied that public ownership of the means of production contributed the results of production to social development, to the socio-orientated distribution of wealth created by the working class. It was also able to guarantee full employment because the economy experienced no cyclical crises. However, the command-administrative system did not stimulate the self-organization of the workers, trade unions as such were transformed into a social department of the enterprises and their decision-making capacity was very limited.

State bureaucracy, representing itself on party committees as well as in the corps of directors of enterprises, was the power that ultimately decided on production matters. In the command-administrative model of the Soviet economy, workers were de facto alienated from the results of their labour. To draw an analogy, the bureaucracy had become a kind of substitute for the owner in the market economy (Kolganov 2011).

Thus, the prevailing type of labour relations in contemporary Russia is directly related to previous periods in their evolution: ideological mobilization (1925–1940), patriarchally hired labour with strong state paternalism (1940–1956) and authoritarianism of the modern period (Voeykov, Anisimova, and Sobolev 2009, 9–11). In other words, the Soviet model of labour relations with its unresolved contradictions
has degenerated in post-Soviet Russia into reactionary and sometimes even into archaic forms of relations between employers and employees.

2. The Character of Privatization in Russia

As state bureaucracy, trade unions and directors of enterprises had previously been the main actors in labour relations, the tripartite model of social partnership was chosen as the most adequate under the new conditions. It introduced a similar triad of actors—the state, the employers and the employees. Paradoxically, its efficiency was complicated not only by the lack of a collective bargaining tradition where employees, represented by trade unions, and employers meet on equal terms but also by the command-administrative model of management being transformed into another, capitalist-style “command-administrative” model of labour relations that was all too ready to neglect social dialogue completely. In a situation where the Russian state had gradually abandoned its social functions as well as the role of arbiter between employees and employers, the so-called authoritarian type of labour regulation came to predominate.

What are the origins of the evolution of this type of employment? The first argument to be focused on is the above-mentioned privatization processes of state enterprises and the creation of private property in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The whole range of Russian economists agrees that there have been three phases of privatization: (1) privatization en masse, from 1992 to 1994; (2) the privatization of cash, from 1994 to 1999 and (3) limited cash privatization from 1999 to 2003. Currently, the government is considering launching a new phase of privatization. In general, the main feature of privatization is the imbalance between the interests of the various social groups or parties and the lack of transparency and independent public control (Dzarasov 2011). In this regard, the process of privatization in Russia has been carried out using either criminal or semi-criminal methods or through informal non-economic interaction. This became a specific feature of the transitional economy. The key actors in this informal interaction were non-economic clan-corporate structures. Professor of political economy, A. Buzgalin, defines their basic methods as personal union, conspiracy, agreement on the division of markets and spheres of influence, the “rules” of competition, as well as extortion, bribery, blackmail, etc. Market competition arises as an imperfect and deformed mutant from the very birth (Buzgalin 1998). Y. Drugov and Y. Simachev agree that the inactivity of the Russian legal system in practice and its adverse character towards law-abiding businesses led to the phenomenon where
Russian economic entities start to follow a dual strategy of behaviour based on family-clan relations. Some property transactions were concluded between people connected through relationships of varying degrees of intimacy. Others were transacted between people under the protection of the same criminal or (if associated with public authorities) semi-legal clan. (Simachev and Drugov, 1999, 116)

I. Rozmainskii (2004) characterizes the existing type of capitalism in Russia as family and clan capitalism:

Family and crony capitalism is an economy with inefficient resource-allocation and slow economic growth, at least if you compare it with “normal” market (“cash”) economies. Inadequate and conflicting laws, the availability of legal voids (as contained in laws referring to other, non-existent laws); the prevalence of opportunism and the lack of foresight in investment politics; a low degree of rational economic behaviour, the fact that people focus on family and clan relations, a large amount of barter and non-cash payment, the huge size of the informal sector and the gradual blurring of boundaries between legal and illegal activities—all of these characteristics of family and crony capitalism condemn it to wasting resources and to economic stagnation. (59)

3. The Consequences for the Working Class

According to the Rosstat, more than 62% of all enterprises and organizations had been privatized (more than 72% in industry) by the middle of the 1990s (Nureev 2010). The first wave of privatization led to a sharp decline in production, to growing social differentiation among the population and to the reduction in the level of wages. In particular, by 2000, wages had been in steady decline: by one third between 1991 and 1995. In 2000, real wages stood at a half to a third of their 1991 level (Voeykov, Anisimova, and Sobolev 2009, 9–11; see Figure 1).

All the more, the social responsibility of the companies in the 1990–2000s had been steadily decreasing as it is shown in Table 1.

Privatization led to the following changes in the structure of employment. First, it generated new interests among the directors of (formerly state-owned) private enterprises. The state, having ceased to exist as a direct power, could not play a part in growing social differentiation among the population and to the reduction in the level of wages. In particular, by 2000, wages had been in steady decline: by one third between 1991 and 1995. In 2000, real wages stood at a half to a third of their 1991 level (Voeykov, Anisimova, and Sobolev 2009, 9–11; see Figure 1).

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Secondly, the process of privatization affected the trade union movement in a special way. Having been integrated into the administrative system of Soviet enterprises (organizations) and having implemented mainly distributive functions, the traditional trade unions (e.g., the heir of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, namely, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions [FNPR]) were deprived of that status during the transformational period. Moreover, they were challenged to seek a new strategy in the relationship with the employers. As the “eighties” turned into the “nineties,” an independent, new trade union movement arose, actively promoting the labour interests of employees and regarding itself as powerful as the bosses. Altogether, the first decade of reforms caused the Russian

Table 1  Dynamics of the Level and the Structure of the Organization (Company) Expenditures for Labour Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditures on average per month for workforce</th>
<th>Expenditures on workforce</th>
<th>Out of them, in % as a result of wage expenses</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1275.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1,919.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2,094.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4,358.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>7,644</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>13,336.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>20,683.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>28,590.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

trade unions to form different models of relationships with employers and the state, to search for internal forms of interaction within the trade union community and even a new image of trade unionism itself. How these problems were approached by traditional and alternative trade unions will be discussed below. In short, it should be emphasized that a fundamental question for the trade union movement after the collapse of the USSR was to redefine the role and purpose of a trade union in the public’s consciousness.

Thirdly, the new private owners resorted to various methods of evading taxes, thereby legalizing the non-payment of wage debts. One such method adopted was to split companies into several subdivisions. Some of these “daughter companies” simply served to accumulate wage and tax debts until they were declared bankrupt. At the same time, other divisions continued the business often with the same management. But the workers employed at the bankrupt daughter lost their jobs in return for the lowest compensation possible. Employment with the “new” company demanded a “new” application, which also enabled the employer to get rid of unwanted trade union activists. It was a means of putting pressure on trade unions.

4. Social Partnership as a Political Strategy

This is an incomplete list of initial changes generated by privatization. They combine with problems corresponding to the lack of an institutional framework for the regulation of labour relations at grass-roots level (enterprises) under the new conditions. As a response to the growing number of strikes between 1989 and 1991, especially in the mining industry, the Russian government initiated “Social Partnership” in 1991. It was declared as a principle for settling labour conflicts at the federal level. In particular, in the Presidential Decree on Social Partnership and Labour Disputes (conflicts), the chief activities of social partnership included (1) signing annual general agreements between the Government of the Russian Federation and authorized representatives of the associations, by republic, of trade unions and employers; (2) signing tripartite sectoral agreements; (3) sharing responsibility for the socio-economic development of a particular industry among the owners of production; (4) establishing Republic Commissions to sign the general agreements between employers, unions and government; and (5) creating a mechanism for the solution of labour disputes consisting only in control functions on the side of the state authorities. At the enterprise level, however, there existed a lack of understanding of the role of social partnership and interest in promoting the principles and practice of equal partnership inherent in the ideology of a market economy.
Therefore, the key contradiction in the birth of labour relations in Russia consists of the ideological choice of the state as promoter of the social partnership model and its failure to stimulate its development. This failure means not only the inertia of the central and regional authorities when it comes to establishing social partnership as a specific framework of labour relations and regulations but also a conscious, progressive abandonment of the state function of mediator in social and labour relations. This issue is central to understanding the birth of labour relations in Russia in the transitional period.

This inertia in establishing social partnership is not identical to a similar lameness on the part of many states concerning social questions. The Russian state played the decisive role in introducing capitalism. There was none of the usual governmental weakness towards big capital because, in Russia, it had yet to be created. So it is clear that, for the Russian state and its leading bureaucracy, the creation of capital and capital owners had priority.

5. Practical Contradictions of Social Partnership

According to some economists and sociologists,

In our country, the state is not just a humble moderator of the dialogue, but an organizer and a full and active participant in the process. In this sense tripartism—the interaction of government, business and workers most adequately reflects the Russian feature. (Voeykov, Anisimova, and Sobolev 2009, 48)

At the federal level, social partnership is manifested in the work of the Russian Trilateral Commission for the Regulation of Social and Labour Relations (RTK). As already noted, the Commission is composed of representatives of the All-Russian associations of trade unions, nationwide employers’ associations and the Government of the Russian Federation.3

The representation of the All-Russian associations of trade unions in the RTK is determined according to the number of members in a respective trade union.4 In this context, the dominant number of places on behalf of the trade union organizations belongs to the FNPR, which had up to 37 million members in the 1990s (now down to 23.5 million).5 On behalf of the new (alternative) associations of trade unions, previously the All-Russian Confederation of Labour (VKT) and the Confederation of Labour of Russia (KTR), up to 2.4 million members in the RTK are represented together. After the Unity Congress between the VKT and the KTR in 2011, the newly founded KTR now represents 2 million (Kravchenko 2013). The vast majority of the seats in the RTK on behalf of employers’ associations belongs to the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP).
Despite the fact that the Russian Trilateral Commission represents the official position of the government’s commitment to social partnership through the adoption of general agreements, academic experts identify the following reasons for its disadvantages: the sole advisory status of the RTK giving rise to recommendatory provisions in agreements that are particularly violated by the Government itself. The latter can be seen in the uncoordinated adoption of the annual state budget without taking into account the commitments the Government made in the articles of the Agreement (Borisov 2001). In addition, employers’ associations consider the participation in social partnership at governmental level “as an additional channel of communication with the authorities” or the ability to “promote their corporate interests” (Turina 2001).

The institutionalization of social partnership at the regional level limps behind the federal. The efficiency of regional trilateral commissions to resolve the social and labour disputes depends on the power of the regional governments. However, the question of how government implements the functions of the “third” partner as an arbitrator between employers and employees depends on the given level of social conflict. For example, in the 1990s, the activities of public authorities mostly followed the pressure engendered by strikes and spontaneous protest movements caused by prolonged non-payment of wages. The peak of strike activity occurred in 1998 during the so-called “rail war.” Wage debts had become a powerful impetus in the rise of alternative trade unions. These urgent circumstances caused the inauguration of a trilateral inter-ministerial committee to sign up regional and sectoral agreements in the chemical and metallurgical industries as well as in the public sector. Being part of the litigation process, workers could now count on the mutual resolution of labour conflict.

The state has thus shown certain concessions by exerting administrative pressure on employers, but it can hardly be said that it fundamentally promotes the development of tripartism. At the moment according to the report of the Ministry of Labour in 2010, the number of workers covered by collective agreements was 27,933,794 (62.2%) of 44,933,685 employed in 4,279,761 organizations (including private companies and public structures). So it means that only a third (1/3) of the economically active population (of around 74 million) is under the protection of collective agreement. About 57% of all collective agreements (223,344 in 2010) were signed in companies with state or municipal forms of property. Of all sectors of the economy, the highest percentage of collective agreements is to be found in education, the service sector, accommodation services, industry, health care, culture and art.

As reported by the regional state authorities on labour, the main factors impeding collective bargaining are the unstable financial conditions of companies, a lack of will on the employers’ side to take on social obligations, the absence
of trade-union organizations and employees’ passivity towards the conduct of collective negotiations.7

6. Labour Relations in the Context of the Power-Property Matrix

The author considers that the fundamental reasons for this policy lay in the specific, historically developed matrix of the relationship between power and property in Russia, which could take different forms at different times but as such reproduced no essential change. This is clearly the case concerning the period of transition to the market economy. How is that matrix expressed today?

At the end of the 1990s, the state, without trade-union consent, initiated a rather radical change in labour law, prompting it along the path of its deterioration, which was realized in the early 2000s. The memorandum of the Government of the Russian Federation and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation on economic policy and financial stability (July 20, 1998) defined the steps in the implementation of economic measures in the country as a condition for receiving loans from the International Monetary Fund. It included measures of an openly anti-union nature to reform the labour market. Paragraph 35 of the document reads as follows: Restrictions on the termination of employment agreements were a hindrance to the effective restructuring of enterprises and the distribution of labour resources in the economy.8 Prior to November 1, 1998, a new draft of the Labour Code of the Russian Federation was introduced to the State Duma to bring labour law into conformity with the requirements of the market economy. The Code set the minimum social security, enhance the role of individual employment agreements, including facilitating the termination of those agreements such as the elimination of the need and requirements of the consent of trade unions on hired-worker employment, and expand the possibility of concluding fixed-term and part-time employment contracts. Russian trade unions were able to see a copy of the memorandum only with the support of international trade unions.

The clan nature of the privatization of property is not the only feature of the development of Russian capitalism: the very nature of its informal ties, the tradition of unity together with power and property and demand of the protection of property rights against state competitors. In this sense, the reverse processes ensued when the state began taking ownership of many large companies. As noted by Professor R. Dzarasov (2010), if, in the 1990s, it was merely “capture by the state,” then it had become “the capture of business” by the mid-2000s. It meant the division of property in big business in favour of the state bureaucracy. The process of the “return” of the state into property between 2000 and 2003 was aiming at “optimizing direct involvement in the economy” (Radygin, Simachev, and Entov 2011, 13). In the following years, from 2004 to 2008, the state sector increased
significantly. Currently, experts estimate the share of the state sector in Russia’s economy to be close to 50%, especially in key sectors such as oil production at 40% to 45% (10% in 1998–1999), banking industry at 49% and transport at 73%.9

In the late Soviet period—the Gorbachev era—“members of the bureaucracy had a natural tendency to ‘add’ property to government” (Nureev 2006) for which they were willing to give up a certain degree of power and reshuffle the system in order to purchase the property, thus becoming a motor of transformation. But after the first wave of privatization in the 1990s, the state bureaucracy, on the contrary, started again to take over property in public ownership because the badly run economy required informal and material support from the state which, in return, wanted control over the assets. How is this merging of state and business interests reflected in the employment relationship? According to trade unionists, the functions of the state in regard to employment are defined as follows:

The State Labour Inspectorate advises employers on how to get rid of union leaders [. . .], and collective agreements made in factories—they’re capitulation contracts. (A member of the Tyumen regional trade union centre)

The state now determines everything, but often leaves the a priori weaker employee alone to face the employer. (A member of the Trade Union RAS, Moscow)

Officials everywhere are struggling to prevent normal trade union activities. Again, we have no perception of trade union culture, ranging from the governor to the employees, that the union has the right to engage in dialogue with the employer, is an instrument with real influence. (A member of the Interregional Trade Union of Automobile Workers [MPRA], St. Petersburg)

The state is entirely on the side of the employer. The state has been virtually eliminated from the establishment of social standards, which should limit the capacity of capital. By the way, without the establishment of such standards, all discussions about social partnership are demagoguery. (An expert from School of Labour Democracy, Moscow)

The government is doing everything to minimize the role of trade unions. Officials give only a formal reply. One solution is the Labour Court, but the current courts do not understand what is going on. [. . .] No court has ever overturned a decision made by the State’s authority. (A member of the Russian Trade Union of Seamen PM, St. Petersburg)

The State is in fact a referee standing on the side of the employer. We cannot say that our state is the guarantor of social and labour rights. (A member of Inter-regional trade union “New trade unions,” St. Petersburg)

The State is an open defender of employers and property owners through all available means of influence. (A member of the Ural trade union centre, Yekaterinburg)

The state in most cases takes the employer’s side. This is evident from the repression of trade unionists, especially in large enterprises. (A member of the trade union Zashita, Irkutsk)
Big business holds real power. Its lobbyists fill all the authorities and parliaments, etc. They have the resources to represent those or other capital entities. The huge level of corruption in Russia has become legendary. (A member of the MPRA, Kaluga)

The state would play a positive role in social and labour relations if only it weren’t corrupted by the employer, and that I believe in modern Russia has become a universal thing, especially if the employer is a large profitable enterprise, playing a big role in the infrastructure of the municipality of the region. (Another member of the trade union Zashita, Irkutsk)

What is the reason for the unanimity of the respondents regarding the role of the state authority in labour relations?

In fact, today a “fusion” of the interests of two of the three “partners” has occurred. The ties between the state and business, especially strong, have become closer as if to add the direct ownership of property by the state bureaucracy to the established corrupt channels of communication. This reflects the traditional continuity of power and property in Russia and is the object of extensive economic, sociological and historico-philosophical research (Voslensky 1990; Radaev and Shkaratan 1991).

The essence of this power-property relationship is evident in the following descriptive comparison (see Table 2):

Table 2  Comparison on the Essence of Power-Property Relation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Russian matrix of power-property relationships</th>
<th>Western institutional matrix or the system of individualized private property</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It presents itself as an institution of public utility and interest*</td>
<td>Private individual or collective ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Its actors are public officials, that is, owners of power</td>
<td>Private individual or collective ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>These owner-holders are obliged by the hierarchical system to act within the overall economic strategy of the government</td>
<td>Free disposal and use of possession, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A system of incentives secures administrative coercion and control</td>
<td>Individual incentives to increase personal wealth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic decisions like the allocation of resources or sales figures are made in a centralized and administrative way</td>
<td>Free market exchange (“arm’s length” transactions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The guarantors of property rights are the special executive units of the central and regional authorities</td>
<td>Courts, law enforcement agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The deliberate decisions made by state officials concerning property have eroded the legal framework of ownership to such an extent that private companies also have to seek support from the state</td>
<td>Property rights are well specified by legal procedures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nureev and Runov (2002).
Note: *For example, Gazprom regards itself as a company of “national heritage.”
In different historical periods, the layout of the Russian power-property matrix and its formalization have depended on certain social conditions and constraints. In the case of the command economy of the Soviet period, that matrix was restricted by the social power of the working class and the values of socialism displayed in such forms as the social protection of labour legally enforced by the Labour Law Code of the RSFSR of December 1918 (later on the USSR), free education, health and access to cultural benefits.

During the transition period, these restrictions were gradually lifted. Nowadays, the matrix of power-property displays itself differently in its impact on the employment relationship. Namely, the increasing role of state bureaucracy as the guarantor of property rights through executive decision making instead of through an independent legal system weakens its function as a protector of labour rights and interests.

As a result, state authorities have responded to labour conflicts either by their open or disguised backing of the employers’ position, or by the repression of trade-union activists. This practice of state mediation is most obvious in open labour conflicts. In particular, during the go-slow “Italian strike” (“Bummelstreik,” “Dienst nach Vorschrift”) in June 2009 at the Kaluga plant of Volkswagen Group Rus, organized by the local union of MPRA in response to bonus cuts by the employer and on account of inadequate safety conditions at the workplace, the regional governor expressed support for the employer’s position, stating that there would be no toleration of significant losses for the foreign investor due to the strike. The members of the MPRA at the Kaluga plant of Benteler Automotive, who also organized strikes, concluded that “the state took part in the labour conflict by sending police to surveille and surround the enterprise.” Between 2007 and 2010 at the Ural Aluminum Plant, the Independent Trade Union of Metallurgists “NABAT” faced constant control by the authorities rather than by the employer when employees demanded wage increases in accordance with sectoral agreements. Finally, the trade unionists faced criminal charges. The trade union Zashita in the Antipinsky Refinery Plant in Tyumen region has been trying to bring numerous allegations and claims to the prosecution office and the courts since 2011 and has not yet obtained legal support for the re-instatement at the workplace of the illegally dismissed trade-union members who founded the union.

7. Summary

In summary, we can conclude that, having chosen tripartism as the basis of labour-relations regulation in post-Soviet Russia, the government has presided over its non-development. Without fulfilling the role of moderator between employers and employees or at least neutralizing its role in labour relations, the
state authorities have taken to using punitive and administrative functions against active employees’ self-organizations, and that shifts the balance grossly in favour of employers. Without wishing to idealize the first decade of the transitional period (the 1990s), it should be noted that the legal framework of labour relations at that time, with strong pressure coming from the trade unions, was able to settle labour disputes through compromise. The second phase in the evolution of Russia’s labour relations (the 2000s) is characterized by labour law itself losing even its formal status as a protector of labour rights.

Acknowledgements

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Notes

1. From an interview with a representative of the Tyumen regional trade-union centre, Tyumen, September 2012.
2. See the presidential decree of the Russian Federation on social partnership no. 212, November 15, 1991.
3. See the federal law on the Russian trilateral commission for the regulation of social and labour relations no. 92, May 1, 1999.
5. To count the trade unions cooperating with the Federation of Independent Trade Unions (FNPR) on the basis of agreements, the number of FNPR membership is 24.2 millions of people.
7. See note 6.
10. From the interview with the representative of the Interregional Trade Union of Automobile Workers (MPRA) from the Kaluga plant Volkswagen Group Rus, November 2012.
12. From the interview with the representative of the Primary Trade Union Organization (PPO) Interregional association of workers trade union “Zashita” at the Antipinsky oil refinery production plant, Tyumen, September 2012.

References


